FreeStyle Libre 2 More Encryption Notes

Foreword: I know that I said I wouldn’t put reverse engineering projects as part of the Monday schedule, but I find myself having an unbalance between the two set of posts, and I wanted to get this out sooner rather than later, in the hope someone else can make progress.

You may remember I have been working on the FreeStyle Libre 2 encrypted communication protocol for a few months. I have actually taken a break from my Ghidra deep dive while I tried sorting my future out – and failing, thanks to the lockdown – but I got back to this a couple of weeks ago, since my art project completed, and I wanted to see if sleeping it over a bit meant getting a clearer view of it.

Unfortunately, I don’t think I’m any closer to figuring out how to speak to Libre 2 readers. I did manage to find some more information about the protocol, including renaming one of the commands to match the debug logs in the application. I do have some more information about the encoding though, which I thought I would share with the world, hoping it will help the next person trying to get more details on this — and hoping that they would share it with the world as well.

While I don’t have a final answer on what encryption they use on the Libre 2, I do have at least some visualization of what’s going on in the exchange sequence.

There’s 15 bytes sent from the Libre 2 reader to the software. The first eight are the challenge, while the other seven look like a nonce of some kind, possibly an initialization vector, which is used in the encryption phase only.

To build the challenge response, another eight bytes are filled with random returned by CryptGenRandom, which is a fairly low level, and deprecated, API. This is curious, given that the software itself is using Qt for the UI, but makes more sense when you realise that they use the same exact code in the driver used for uploading to the LibreView service, which is not Qt based. It also likely explains why the encryption is not using the QtCryptography framework at all.

This challenge response is then encrypted with a key — there are two sets of keys: Authorization keys are used only for this challenge phase, and Session keys are used to handle the rest of the communication. Each set includes an Encryption and a MAC key. The Authorization keys are both seeded with just the serial number of the device in ASCII form, and two literal strings, as pictured above: AuthrEnc and AuthrMAC. The session keys’ seeds include a pair of 8-bytes values as provided by the device after the authorization completes.

The encryption used is either a streaming cipher or a 64-bit block cipher. I know that, because I have multiple captures from the same device in which the challenge started with the same 8 bytes (probably because it lacked enough entropy to be properly random at initialization time), and they encrypted to exactly the same output bytes. Since the cleartext adds a random component, if it was a 128-bit block cipher, you would expect different ciphertext in the output — which kind of defeats the purpose of those 8 random bytes I guess?

The encrypted challenge response is then embedded in the response message, which includes four constant bytes (they define the message type, the length, and the subcommand, plus an extra constant byte thrown in), and then processed by the MAC algorithm (with the Authorization MAC key) to produce a 64-bit MAC, that is tackled at the end of the message. Then the whole thing is sent to the device, which will finally start answering.

As far as I can tell, the encryption algorithm is the same for Authorization and Session — with the exception of the different seed to the key generation. It also includes a different way to pass a nonce — the session encryption includes a sequence number, on both the device and the software, which is sent in clear text and fed into the encryption (shifted left by 18 bits, don’t ask me!) In addition to the sequence number, the encrypted packets have an unencrypted MAC. This is 4 bytes, but it’s actually done with the same algorithm as the authorization. The remaining 4 bytes are just dropped on the floor.

There’s a lot more that I need to figure out in the code, because not knowing anything about cryptography (and also not being that good with Ghidra). I know that the key generation and the encryption/decryption functions are parameterized with an algorithm value, which likely corresponds to an enum from the library they used. And that the parameterized functions dispatch via 21 objects (but likely not C++ objects, as they don’t seem to use vtables!), which can either point at a common function that returns an error (pretty much “not implemented”) or to an actual, implemented function — the functions check something: the enum in the case of key creation (which is, by the way, always 9), or some attribute of the object passed in for encryption and decryption.

These are clearly coming from a library linked in statically — I can tell because the code style for these is totally different from any other part of Abbott’s code, and makes otherwise no sense. It also is possibly meant to be obfuscated, or at least made it difficult — it’s not the same object out of the 21 that can answer the encrypt/decrypt function for the object, which makes it difficult to find which code is actually being executed.

I think at this point, the thing that is protecting their Libre 2 protocol the most is just the sheer amount of different styles of code in the binary: Qt, C++ with STL, C++ with C-style arrays, Windows APIs, this strange library, …

By the way, one thing that most likely would help with figuring this out would be if we could feed selected command streams into the software. While devices such as the Facedancer can help, given that most of this work is done in virtual machines, I would rather have my old idea implemented. I might look for time to work on this if I can’t find anyone interested, but if you find that this is an useful idea, I would much prefer being involved but not leading its implementation. Honestly, if I had more resources available, I would probably just pay someone to implement it, rather than buy a hardware Facedancer.

FreeStyle Libre 2: Notes From The Deep Dive

As I wrote last week, I’ve started playing with Ghidra to dive into the FreeStyle Libre 2 software, to try and figure out how to speak the encrypted protocol, which is in the way to access the Libre 2 device as we already access the Libre 1.

I’m not an expert when it comes to binary reverse engineering — most of the work I’ve done around reverse engineering has been on protocols that are not otherwise encrypted. But as I said in the previous post, the binary still included a lot of debug logs. In particular, the logs included the name of the class, and the name of the method, which made it fairly easy to track down quite a bit of information on how the software works, as well as the way the protocols work.

I also got lucky to find a second implementation of their software protocol. At least a partial one. You see, there’s two software that can communicate with the old Libre system: the desktop software that appears to be available in Germany, Australia, and a few other countries, and the “driver” for LibreView, a service that allows GPs, consultants, and hospitals to remotely access the blood sugar readings of their patients. (I should write about it later.) While the main app is a single, mostly statically linked Qt graphical app, the “driver” is composed of a number of DLL modules, which makes it much easier to read.

Unfortunately it does not appear to support the Libre 2 and its encryption, but it does help to figure out other details around the rest of the transport protocol, since it’s much better logged, and provides clearer view of the function structure — it seems like the two packages actually come from the same codebase, as a number of classes share the same name between the two implementations.

The interesting part is trying to figure out what the various codenames mean. I found the names Orpheus and Apollo in the desktop app, and I assumed the former was the Libre and the latter the Libre 2, because the encryption is implemented only on the Apollo branch of the hierarchy, in particular in a class called ApolloCryptoLib. But then again, in the “driver” I found the codenames Apollo and Athena — and since the software says it supports the “Libre Pro” (which as far as I know is the US-only version that was released a few years ago), I’m wholly confused on what’s what now.

But as I said, the software does have parallel C++ class hierarchies, implementing lower-level and higher-level access controls for the two codenames. And because the logs include the class name it looks like most functions are instantiated twice (which is why I found it easier to figure out the flow for the non-crypto part from the “driver” module.) A lot of the work I’m doing appears to be manual vtable decoding, since there’s a lot of virtual methods all around.

What also became very apparent is that my hunch was right: the Libre 2 system uses basically the same higher level protocol as the Libre 1. Indeed, I can confirm not only that the text commands sent are the same (and the expected responses are the same, as well), but also that the binary protocol is parsed in the same way. So the only obstacle between glucometerutils and the Libre 2 is the encryption. Indeed, it seems like all three devices use the same protocol, which is either called Shazam, AAP or ATP — it’s not quite clear given the different set of naming conventions in the code, but it’s still pretty obvious that they share the same protocol, not just the HID transport, but also for defining higher level commands.

Now about the encryption, what I found from looking at the software is that there are two sets of keys that are used. The first is used in the “authentication” phase, which is effectively a challenge-response between the device and the software, based on the serial number of the device, and the other is used in the encrypted communication. This was fairly easy to spot, because one of the classes in the code is named ApolloCryptoLib, and it included functions with names like Encrypt, Decrypt, and GenerateKeys.

Also one note that important: the patch (sensor) serial number is not used for the encryption of the reader’s access. This is something that comes up time and time again. Indeed at least a few people have been telling me on Twitter that the Libre 2 sensors (or patches, as Abbott calls them) are also encrypted and that clearly they use the same protocol for the reader. But that’s not the case at all. Indeed, the same encryption happens when no patch was ever initialized, and the information on the patches is fetched from the reader as the last part of the initialization.

Another important piece of information that I found in the code is that the encryption uses separate keys for encryption and MAC. This means that there’s an actual encryption transport layer, similar to TLS, but not similar enough to worry me so much regarding the key material present.

With the code at hand, I also managed to confirm my original basic assumptions about the initialization using sub-commands, where the same message type is sent with a follow-up bytes including information on the command. The confirmation came from a log message calling the first byte in the command… subcmd. The following diagram is my current best understanding of the initialization flow:

Initialization sequence for the FreeStyle Libre 2 encryption protocol.

Unfortunately, most of the functions that I have found related to the encryption (and to the binary protocol, at least in the standalone app) ended up being quite complicated to read. At first I thought this was a side effect of some obfuscation system, but I’m no longer sure. It might be an effect of the compile/decompile cycle, but at least on Ghidra these appear as huge switch blocks, with what is effectively a state machine jumping around, even for the most simple of the methods.

I took a function that is (hopefully) the least likely to get Abbott upset for me reposting it. It’s a simple function: it takes an integer and returns an integer. I called it int titfortat(int) because it took me a while to figure out what it was meant to do. It turns out to normalize the input to either 0, 1 or -1 — the latter being an error condition. It has an invocation of INT3 (a debugger trap), and it has the whole state machine construct I’ve seen in most of the other functions. What I found about this function is that it’s used to set a variable based on whether the generated keys are used for authentication or session.

The main blocker for me right now to figure out how the encryption is working, is that it looks like there’s an array of 21 different objects, each of which comes with what looks like a vtable, and only partially implemented. It does not conform to the way Visual C++ is building objects, so maybe it’s a static encryption library linked inside, or something different altogether. The functions I can reach from those objects are clearly cryptography-related: they include tables for SHA1 and SHA2 at least.

The way the objects are used is also a bit confusing: an initialization function appears to assign to each pointer in the array the value returned by a different function — but each of the functions appear to only return the value of a (different) global. Whenever the vtable-like is not fully implemented, it appears to be pointing at code that simply return an error constant. And when the code is calling those objects, if an error is returned it skips the object and go to the next.

On the other hand, this exercise is giving me a lot of insights about the insight of the overall HID transport as well as the protocol inside of it. For example, I finally found the answer to which checksum the binary messages include! It’s a modified CRC32, except that it’s calculated over 4-bit at a time instead of the usual 8, and thus requires a shortened lookup table (16 entries instead of 256) — and if you think that this is completely pointless, I tend to agree with you. I also found that some of the sub-commands for the ATP protocol include an extra byte before the actual sub-command identifier. I’m not sure how those are interpreted yet, and it does not seem to be a checksum, as they are identical for different payloads.

Anyway, this is clearly not enough information yet to proceed with implementing a driver, but it might be just enough information to start improving the support for the binary protocol (ATP) if the Libre 2 turns out not to understand the normal text commands. Which I find very unlikely, but you we’ll have to see.

Leveling up my reverse engineering: time for Ghidra

In my quest to figure out how to download data from the Abbott FreeStyle Libre 2, I decided that figuring it out just by looking at the captures was a dead end. While my first few captures had me convinced the reader would keep sending the same challenge, and so I could at least replay that, it turned out to be wrong, and that excluded most of the simplest/silliest of encryption schemes.

As Pierre suggested me on Twitter, the easiest way to find the answer would be to analyze the binary itself. This sounded like a hugely daunting task for myself, as I don’t speak fluent Intel assembly, and particularly I don’t speak fluent Windows interfaces. The closest I got to this in the past has been the reverse engineering of the Verio, in which I ran the software on top of WinDbg and discovered, to my relief, that they not just kept some of the logging on, but also a whole lot of debug logs that made it actually fairly easy to reverse the whole protocol.

But when the options are learning enough about cryptography and cryptanalysis to break the encoding, or spend time learning how to reverse engineer a Windows binary — yeah I thought the latter would suit me better. It’s not like I have not dabbled in reversing my own binaries, or built my own (terrible) 8086 simulator in high school, because I wanted to be able to see how the registers would be affected, and didn’t want to wait for my turn to use the clunky EEPROM system we used in the lab (this whole thing is probably a story for another day).

Also, since the last time I considered reversing a binary (when I was looking at my laptop’s keyboard), there’s a huge development: the NSA released Ghidra. For those who have not heard, Ghidra is a tool to reverse engineer binaries that includes a decompiler, and a full blown UI. And it’s open source. Given that the previous best option for this was IDA Pro, with thousands of dollars of licenses expected, this opened a huge amount of doors.

So I spent a weekend in which I had some spare time to try my best on reversing the actual code coming from the official app for the Libre 2 — I’ll provide more detail of that once I understand it better, and I know which parts are critical to share, and which one would probably get me in trouble. In general, I did manage to find out quite a bit more about the software, the devices, and the protocol — if nothing else, because Abbott left a bunch of debug logging disabled, but built in (and no, this time the WinDbg trick didn’t work because they seems to have added an explicit anti-debugger exception (although, I guess I could learn to defeat that, while I’m at it).

Because I was at first a bit skeptical about my ability to do anything at all with this, I also have been running it in an Ubuntu VM, but honestly I’m considering switching back to my normal desktop because something on the Ubuntu default shell appears to mess with Java, and I can’t even run the VM at the right screen size. I have also considered running this in a Hyper-V virtual machine on my Gamestation, but the problem with that appears to be graphics acceleration: installing OpenSUSE onto it was very fast, but trying to use it was terribly sloppy. I guess the VM option is a bit nicer in the sense that I can just save it to power off the computer, as I did to add the second SSD to the NUC.

After spending the weekend on it, and making some kind of progress, and printing out some of the code to read it on paper in front of the TV with pen and marker, well… I think I’m liking the idea of this but it’ll take me quite a while, alone, to come up with enough of a description that it can be implemented cleanroom. I’ll share more details on that later. For the most part, I felt like I was for the first time cooking something that I’ve only seen made in the Great British Bake Off — because I kept reading the reports that other (much more experienced) people wrote and published, particularly reversing router firmwares.

I also, for once, found a good reason to use YouTube for tutorials. This video by MalwareTech (yes the guy who got arrested after shutting WannaCry down by chance) was a huge help to figure out features I didn’t even know I wanted, including the “Assume Register” option. Having someone who knows what he’s doing explore a tool I don’t know was very helpful, and indeed it felt like Adam Savage describing his workshop tools — a great way to learn about stuff you didn’t know you needed.

My hope is that by adding this tool to my toolbox – like Adam Savage indeed says in his Every Tool’s A Hammer (hugely recommended reading, by the way) – is that I’ll be able to use it not just to solve the mystery of the Libre 2’s encryption. But also that of the nebulous Libre 1 binary protocol, which I never figured out (there’s a few breadcrumbs I already found during my Ghidra weekend). And maybe even to figure out the protocol of one of the gaming mice I have at home, which I never completed either.

Of course all of this assumes I have a lot more free time than I have had for the past few years. But, you know, it’s something that I might have ideas about.

Also as a side note: while doing the work to figure out which address belongs to what, and particularly figure out the jumps through vtables and arrays of global objects (yeah that seems to be something they are doing), I found myself needing to do a lot of hexadecimal calculations. And while I can do conversions from decimal to binary in my head fairly easily, hex is a bit too much for me. I have been using the Python interactive interpreter for that, but that’s just too cumbersome. Instead, I decided to get myself a good old physical calculator — not least because the Android calculator is not able to do hex, and it seems like there’s a lack of “mid range” calculators: you get TI-80 emulators fairly easily, but most of the simplest calculators don’t have hex. Or they do, but they are terrible at it.

I looked up on Amazon for the cheapest scientific calculator that I could see the letters A-F on, and ordered a Casio fx-83GT X — that was a mistake. When it arrived, I realized that I didn’t pay attention to finding one with the hex key on it. The fx-83GT does indeed have the A-F inputs — but they are used for defining variables only, and the calculator does not appear to have any way to convert to hexadecimal nor to do hexadecimal-based operations. Oops.

Instead I ordered a Sharp WriteView EL-W531, which supports hex just fine. It has slightly smaller, but more satisfying, keys, but it’s yet another black gadget on my table (the Casio is light blue). I’ll probably end up looking out for a cute sticker to put on it to see it when I close it for storage.

And I decided to keep the Casio as well — not just because it’s handy to have a calculator at home when doing paperwork, even with all the computers around, but also because it might be interesting to see how much of the firmware is downloadable, and whether someone has tried flashing a different model’s firmware onto it, to expand its capabilities: I can’t believe the A-F keys are there just for the sake of variables, my guess is that they are there because the same board/case is used by a higher model that does support hex, and I’d expect that the only thing that makes it behave one way or the other is the firmware — or even just flags in it!

At any rate, expect more information about the Libre 2 later on this month or next. And if I decide to spend more time on the Casio as well, you’ll see the notes here on the blog. But for now I think I want to get at least some of my projects closer to completion.

FreeStyle Libre 2: encrypted protocol notes

When I had to write (in a hurry) my comments on Abbott’s DMCA notice to GitHub, I note that I have not had a chance to get my hands onto the Libre 2 system yet, because it’s not sold in the UK. After that, Benjamin from MillionFriends reached out to me to hear if I would be interested in giving a try to figure out how the reader itself speaks with the software. I gladly obliged, and spent most of the time I had during a sick week to get an idea of where we are with this.

While I would lie if I said that we’re now much closer to be able to download data from a Libre 2 reader, I can at least say that we have some ideas of what’s going on right now. So let me try to introduce the problem a second, because there’s a lot of information out there, and while there’s some of it that is quite authoritative (particularly as a few people have been reverse engineering the actual binaries), a lot of it is guesswork and supposition.

The Libre and Libre 2 systems are very similar — they both have sensors, and they both have readers. Technically, you could say that the mobile app (for Android or iOS) also makes up part of the system. The DMCA notice from Abbott that stirred so much trouble above was related to modifications to the mobile application — but luckily for me, my projects and my interests lay quite far away from that. The sensors can be “read” by their respective reader devices, or with a phone with the correct app on it. When reading the sensors with the reader, the reader itself stores the historical data and a bunch more information. You can download that data from the reader onto a computer with Windows or macOS with the official software from Abbott (assuming you can download a version of it that works for you, I couldn’t find a good download page for this on the UK website, but I was provided an EU version of the software as well.)

For the Libre system, I have attempted reversing the protocol, but ultimately it was someone else contributing the details of an usable protocol that I implemented in glucometerutils. For the Libre 2, the discussion already suggested it wouldn’t be the same protocol, and that encryption was used by the Libre 2 reader. As it turns out, Abbott really does not appear to appreciate customers having easy access to their data, or third parties building tools around their devices, and they started encrypting the communication between the sensors and the reader or app in the new system.

So what’s the state with the Libre 2? Well, one of the good news is that the software that I was given works with both the Libre and Libre 2 systems, so I could compare the USB captures on both systems, and that will (as I’ll show in a moment) help significantly. It also showed that the basics of the Abbott HID protocol were maintained: most of the handshake, the message types and the maximum message size. Unfortunately it was clear right away that indeed most of the messages exchanged were encrypted, because the message length made no sense (anything over 62 as length was clearly wrong).

Now, the good news is that I have built up enough interfaces in usbmon-tools that I could use to build a much more reusable extractor for the FreeStyle protocol, and introduce more of the knowledge of the encryption to it, so that it can be used for others. Being able to release these extraction tools I write, instead of just using them myself and letting them rot, was my primary motivation behind building usbmon-tools, so you could say that that’s an achieved target.

So earlier I said that I was lucky the software works with both the Libre and Libre 2 readers. The reason why that was luck, it’s because it shows that the sequence of operations between the two is nearly the same, and that some of the messages are not actually encrypted on the Libre 2 either (namely, the keepalive messages). Here’s the handshake from my Libre 1 reader:

[ 04] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 34] H<<D 00000000: 16                                                . 

[ 0d] H>>D 00000000: 00 00 00 02                                       .... 

[ 05] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 15] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 06] H<<D 00000000: 4A 43 4D 56 30 32 31 2D  54 30 38 35 35 00        JCMV021-T0855. 

[ 35] H<<D 00000000: 32 2E 31 2E 32 00                                 2.1.2. 

[ 01] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 71] H<<D 00000000: 01                                                . 

[ 21] H>>D 00000000: 24 64 62 72 6E 75 6D 3F                           $dbrnum? 

[ 60] H<<D 00000000: 44 42 20 52 65 63 6F 72  64 20 4E 75 6D 62 65 72  DB Record Number
[ 60] H<<D 00000010: 20 3D 20 33 37 32 39 38  32 0D 0A 43 4B 53 4D 3A   = 372982..CKSM:
[ 60] H<<D 00000020: 30 30 30 30 30 37 36 31  0D 0A 43 4D 44 20 4F 4B  00000761..CMD OK
[ 60] H<<D 00000030: 0D 0A                                             .. 

[ 0a] H>>D 00000000: 00 00 37 C6 32 00 34                              ..7.2.4 

[ 0c] H<<D 00000000: 01 00 18 00                                       ....

Funnily enough, while this matches the sequence that Xavier described for the Insulinx, and that I always reused for the other devices too, I found that most of this exchange is for the original software to figure out which device you connected. And since my tools require you to know which device you’re using, I actually cleaned up the FreeStyle support code in glucometerutils to shorten the initialization sequence.

To describe the sequence in prose, the software is requesting the serial number and software version of the reader (commands 0x05 and 0x15), then initializing (0x01) and immediately using the text command $dbrnum? to know how much data is stored on the device. Then it starts using the “binary mode” protocol that I started on years ago, but never understood.

For both the systems, I captured the connection establishment, from when the device is connected to the Windows virtual machine to the moment when you can choose what to do. The software is only requesting a minimal amount of data, but it’s still quite useful for comparison. Indeed, you can see that after using the binary protocol to fetch… something, the software sends a few more text commands to confirm the details of the device:

[ 0b] H<<D 00000000: 12 3C AD 93 0A 18 00 00  00 00 00 9C 2D EA 00 00  .<..........-...
[ 0b] H<<D 00000010: 00 00 00 0E 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 7C 2A EA 00 00  ...........|*...
[ 0b] H<<D 00000020: 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 84 2D EA 00 21  ............-..!
[ 0b] H<<D 00000030: C2 25 43                                          .%C 

[ 21] H>>D 00000000: 24 70 61 74 63 68 3F                              $patch? 

[ 0d] H>>D 00000000: 3D 12 00 00                                       =... 

[ 60] H<<D 00000000: 4C 6F 67 20 45 6D 70 74  79 0D 0A 43 4B 53 4D 3A  Log Empty..CKSM:
[ 60] H<<D 00000010: 30 30 30 30 30 33 36 38  0D 0A 43 4D 44 20 4F 4B  00000368..CMD OK
[ 60] H<<D 00000020: 0D 0A                                             .. 

[ 21] H>>D 00000000: 24 73 6E 3F                                       $sn? 

[ 60] H<<D 00000000: 4A 43 4D 56 30 32 31 2D  54 30 38 35 35 0D 0A 43  JCMV021-T0855..C
[ 60] H<<D 00000010: 4B 53 4D 3A 30 30 30 30  30 33 32 44 0D 0A 43 4D  KSM:0000032D..CM
[ 60] H<<D 00000020: 44 20 4F 4B 0D 0A                                 D OK.. 

[ 21] H>>D 00000000: 24 73 77 76 65 72 3F                              $swver? 

[ 60] H<<D 00000000: 32 2E 31 2E 32 0D 0A 43  4B 53 4D 3A 30 30 30 30  2.1.2..CKSM:0000
[ 60] H<<D 00000010: 30 31 30 38 0D 0A 43 4D  44 20 4F 4B 0D 0A        0108..CMD OK..

My best guess on why it’s asking again for serial number and software version, is that the data returned during the handshake is only used to select which “driver” implementation to use, while this is used to actually fill in the descriptor to show to the user.

If I look at the capture of the same actions with a Libre 2 system, the initialization is not quite the same:

[ 05] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 06] H<<D 00000000: 4D 41 47 5A 31 39 32 2D  4A 34 35 35 38 00        MAGZ192-J4558. 

[ 14] H>>D 00000000: 11                                                . 

[ 33] H<<D 00000000: 16 B1 79 F0 A1 D8 9C 6D  69 71 D9 1A C0 1A BC 7E  ..y....miq.....~ 

[ 14] H>>D 00000000: 17 6C C8 40 58 5B 3E 08  A5 40 7A C0 FE 35 91 66  .l.@X[>..@z..5.f
[ 14] H>>D 00000010: 2E 01 37 88 37 F5 94 71  79 BB                    ..7.7..qy. 

[ 33] H<<D 00000000: 18 C5 F6 DF 51 18 AB 93  9C 39 89 AC 01 DF 32 F0  ....Q....9....2.
[ 33] H<<D 00000010: 63 A8 80 99 54 4A 52 E8  96 3B 1B 44 E4 2A 6C 61  c...TJR..;.D.*la
[ 33] H<<D 00000020: 00 20                                             .  

[ 04] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 0d] H>>D 00000000: 00 00 00 02                                       .... 

[ 34] H<<D 00000000: 16                                                . 

[ 05] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 15] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 06] H<<D 00000000: 4D 41 47 5A 31 39 32 2D  4A 34 35 35 38 00        MAGZ192-J4558. 

[ 35] H<<D 00000000: 31 2E 30 2E 31 32 00                              1.0.12. 

[ 01] H>>D 00000000: 

[ 71] H<<D 00000000: 01                                                . 

[x21] H>>D 00000000: 66 C2 59 40 42 A5 09 07  28 45 34 F2 FB 2E EC B2  f.Y@B...(E4.....
[x21] H>>D 00000010: A0 BB 61 8D E9 EE 41 3E  FC 24 AD 61 FB F6 63 34  ..a...A>.$.a..c4
[x21] H>>D 00000020: 7B 7C 15 DB 93 EA 68 9F  9A A4 1E 2E 0E DE 8E A1  {|....h.........
[x21] H>>D 00000030: D6 A2 EA 53 45 2F A8 00  00 00 00 17 CF 84 64     ...SE/........d 

[x60] H<<D 00000000: 7D C1 67 28 0E 31 48 08  2C 99 88 04 DD E1 75 77  }.g(.1H.,.....uw
[x60] H<<D 00000010: 34 5A 88 CA 1F 6D 98 FD  79 42 D3 F2 4A FB C4 E8  4Z...m..yB..J...
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 75 C0 92 D5 92 CF BF 1D  F1 25 6A 78 7A F7 CE 70  u........%jxz..p
[x60] H<<D 00000030: C2 0F B9 A2 86 68 AA 00  00 00 00 F9 DE 0A AA     .....h......... 

[x0a] H>>D 00000000: 9B CA 7A AF 42 22 C6 F2  8F CA 0E 58 3F 43 9C AB  ..z.B".....X?C..
[x0a] H>>D 00000010: C7 4D 86 DF ED 07 ED F4  0B 99 D8 87 18 B5 8F 76  .M.............v
[x0a] H>>D 00000020: 69 50 4F 6C CE 86 CF E1  6D 9C A1 55 78 E0 AF DE  iPOl....m..Ux...
[x0a] H>>D 00000030: 80 C6 A0 51 38 32 8D 01  00 00 00 62 F3 67 2E     ...Q82.....b.g. 

[ 0c] H<<D 00000000: 01 00 18 00                                       .... 

[x0b] H<<D 00000000: 80 37 B7 71 7F 38 55 56  93 AC 89 65 11 F6 7F E6  .7.q.8UV...e....
[x0b] H<<D 00000010: 31 03 3E 15 48 7A 31 CC  24 AD 02 7A 09 62 FF 9C  1.>.Hz1.$..z.b..
[x0b] H<<D 00000020: D4 94 02 C9 5F FF F2 7B  3B AC F0 F7 99 1A 31 5A  ...._..{;.....1Z
[x0b] H<<D 00000030: 00 B8 7B B7 CD 4D D4 01  00 00 00 E2 D4 F1 13     ..{..M.........

The 0x14/0x33 command/response are new — and they clearly are used to set up the encryption. Indeed, trying to send out a text command without having issued these commands has the reader respond with a 0x33 reply that I interpret as a “missing encryption” error.

But you can also see that there’s a very similar structure to the commands: after the initialization, there’s an (encrypted) text command (0x21) and response (0x60), then there’s an encrypted binary command, and more encrypted binary responses. Funnily enough, that 0x0c response is not encrypted, and the sequence of responses of the same type is very similar between the Libre 1 and Libre 2 captures as well.

The similarities don’t stop here. Let’s look at the end of the capture:

[x0b] H<<D 00000000: A3 F6 2E 9D 4E 13 68 EB  7E 37 72 97 6C F9 7B D6  ....N.h.~7r.l.{.
[x0b] H<<D 00000010: 1F 7B FB 6A 15 A8 F9 5F  BD EC 87 BC CF 5E 16 96  .{.j..._.....^..
[x0b] H<<D 00000020: EB E7 D8 EC EF B5 00 D0  18 69 D5 48 B1 D0 06 A6  .........i.H....
[x0b] H<<D 00000030: 30 1E BB 9B 04 AC 93 DE  00 00 00 B6 A2 4D 23     0............M# 

[x21] H>>D 00000000: CB A5 D7 4A 6C 3A 44 AC  D7 14 47 16 15 40 15 12  ...Jl:D...G..@..
[x21] H>>D 00000010: 8B 7C AF 15 F1 28 D1 BE  5F 38 5A 4E ED 86 7D 20  .|...(.._8ZN..} 
[x21] H>>D 00000020: 1C BA 14 6F C9 05 BD 56  63 FB 3B 2C EC 9E 3B 03  ...o...Vc.;,..;.
[x21] H>>D 00000030: 50 B1 B4 D0 F6 02 92 14  00 00 00 CF FA C2 74     P.............t 

[ 0d] H>>D 00000000: DE 13 00 00                                       .... 

[x60] H<<D 00000000: CE 96 6D CD 86 27 B4 AC  D9 46 88 90 C0 E7 DB 4A  ..m..'...F.....J
[x60] H<<D 00000010: 8D CC 8E AA 5F 1B B6 11  4E A0 2B 08 C0 01 D5 D3  ...._...N.+.....
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 7A E9 8B C2 46 4C 42 B8  0C D7 52 FA E0 8F 58 32  z...FLB...R...X2
[x60] H<<D 00000030: DE 6C 71 3F BE 4E 9A DF  00 00 00 7E 38 C6 DB     .lq?.N.....~8.. 

[x60] H<<D 00000000: 11 06 1C D2 5A AC 1D 7E  E3 4C 68 B2 83 73 DF 47  ....Z..~.Lh..s.G
[x60] H<<D 00000010: 86 05 4E 81 99 EC 29 EA  D8 79 BA 26 1B 13 98 D8  ..N...)..y.&....
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 2D FA 49 4A DF DD F9 5E  2D 47 29 AB AE 0D 52 77  -.IJ...^-G)...Rw
[x60] H<<D 00000030: 2E EB 42 EC 7E CF BB E0  00 00 00 FE D4 DC 7E     ..B.~.........~ 

… Yeah many more encrypted messages …

[x60] H<<D 00000000: 53 FE E5 56 01 BB C2 A7  67 3E A6 AB DB 8E B7 13  S..V....g>......
[x60] H<<D 00000010: 6D F7 80 5C 06 23 09 3E  49 B4 A7 8B D3 61 92 C9  m..\.#.>I....a..
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 72 1D 5A 04 AE E3 3E 05  2E 1B C7 7C 42 2D F8 42  r.Z...>....|B-.B
[x60] H<<D 00000030: 37 88 7E 16 D9 34 8B E9  00 00 00 11 EE 42 05     7.~..4.......B. 

[x21] H>>D 00000000: 01 84 3F 02 36 1E A6 82  E2 C5 BF C2 40 78 B9 CD  ..?.6.......@x..
[x21] H>>D 00000010: E9 55 17 BE E9 16 8A 52  D2 D9 85 69 E4 D5 96 7A  .U.....R...i...z
[x21] H>>D 00000020: 55 6D DF 2E AF 96 36 53  64 C5 C7 D1 B6 6F 1A 1A  Um....6Sd....o..
[x21] H>>D 00000030: 4F 2F 25 FF 58 F4 EE 15  00 00 00 F6 9A 52 64     O/%.X........Rd 

[x60] H<<D 00000000: 19 F4 D4 F0 66 11 E3 CE  47 DE 82 87 22 48 3C 8D  ....f...G..."H<.
[x60] H<<D 00000010: BA 2D C0 37 12 25 CD AB  3A 58 C2 C4 01 88 60 21  .-.7.%..:X....`!
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 15 1E D1 EE F2 90 36 CA  B0 93 92 34 60 F5 89 E0  ......6....4`...
[x60] H<<D 00000030: 64 3C 20 39 BF 4C 98 EA  00 00 00 A1 CE C5 61     d< 9.L........a 

[x21] H>>D 00000000: D5 89 18 22 97 34 CB 6E  76 C5 5A 23 48 F4 5E C6  ...".4.nv.Z#H.^.
[x21] H>>D 00000010: 0E 11 0E C9 51 BD 40 D7  81 4A DF 8A 0B EF 28 82  ....Q.@..J....(.
[x21] H>>D 00000020: 1F 14 47 BC B8 B8 FA 44  59 7A 86 14 14 4B D7 0F  ..G....DYz...K..
[x21] H>>D 00000030: 37 48 CC 1F C5 A2 9E 16  00 00 00 00 A3 EE 69     7H............i 

[x60] H<<D 00000000: 62 33 4B 90 3B 68 3A D1  01 B1 15 4C 48 A1 6E 20  b3K.;h:....LH.n 
[x60] H<<D 00000010: 12 6F BC D5 50 33 9E C3  CC 35 4E C8 46 81 3E 6B  .o..P3...5N.F.>k
[x60] H<<D 00000020: 96 17 DF D5 8C 22 5C 3A  B7 52 C2 D9 37 71 B7 E2  ....."\:.R..7q..
[x60] H<<D 00000030: 5F C4 88 81 2A 91 65 EB  00 00 00 69 E2 A8 DE     _...*.e....i...

These are once again text commands. In particular one of them gets a response that is long enough to span multiple encrypted text responses (0x60). Given that the $patch? command on the Libre 1 suggested it’s a multirecord command, it might be that the Libre 2 actually has a long list of patches.

So my best guess of this is that, aside for the encryption, the Libre 2 and Libre 1 systems are actually pretty much the same. I’m expecting that the only thing between us and being able to download the data out of a Libre 2 system is to figure out the encryption scheme and whether we need to extract keys to be able to do so. In the latter case that is something we should proceed carefully with, because it’s probably going to be the way Abbott is going to enforce their DMCA requests.

What do we know about the encryption setup, then? Well, I had a theory, but then it got completely trashed. I still got some guesses that for now appear solid.

First of all, the new 0x14/0x33 command/reply: this is called multiple time by the software, and the reader uses the 0x33 response to tell you either the encryption is missing or wrong, so I’m assuming these commands are encryption related. But since there’s more than one meaning for these commands, it looks like the first byte for each of these selects a “sub-command”.

The 0x14,0x11 command appears to be the starting point for the encryption; the device responds with what appears to be 15 random bytes. Not 16! The first byte again appears to be a “typing” specification and is always 0x16. You could say that the 0x14,0x11 command gets a 0x33,0x16 response. In the first three captures I got from the software, the device actually sent exactly the same bytes. Then it started giving a different response for each time I called it. So I guess it might be some type of random value, that needs some entropy to be re-generated. Maybe it’s a nonce for the encryption?

The software then sends a 0x14,0x17 command, which at first seemed to have a number of constant bytes in positions, but now I’m not so sure. I guess I need to compare more captures for that to be the case. But because of the length, there’s at most 25 bytes that are sent to the device.

The 0x33,0x18 response comes back, and it includes 31 bytes, but the last two appear to be constant.

Also if I compare the three captures, two that received the same 0x33,0x16 response, and one that didn’t, there are many identical bytes between the two with the same response (but not all of them!), and very few with the third one. So it sounds like either this is a challenge-response that uses the provided nonces, or it actually uses that value to do the key derivation.

If you’re interested in trying to figure out the possible encryption behind this, the three captures are available on GitHub. And if you find anything else that you want to share with the rest of the people looking at this, please let us know.