Do you remember the infamous “slowloris” attack over HTTP webservers? Well, it turns out there is a new variant of the same technique, that rather than making the server wait for headers to arrive, makes the server wait for POST data before processing; it’s difficult to explain exactly how that works, so I’ll leave it to the expert explanation from ModSecurity
Thankfully, since there was a lot of work done to cover up the slowloris attack, there are easy protections to be put in place, the first of which would be the use of mod_reqtimeout… unfortunately, it isn’t currently enabled by the Gentoo configuration of Apache – see bug #347227 – so the first step is to workaround this limitation. Until the Gentoo Apache team appears again, you can do so simply by making use of the per-package environment hack, sort of what I’ve described in my previous nasty trick spost a few months ago.
# to be created as /etc/portage/env/www-servers/apache
export EXTRA_ECONF="${EXTRA_ECONF} --enable-reqtimeout=static"
*Do note that here I’m building it statically; this is because I’d suggest everybody to build all the modules as static; the overhead of having them as plugins is usually quite higher than what you’d have for loading a module that you don’t care about.*
Now that you got this set up, you should ensure to set a timeout for the requests; the mod_reqtimeout documentation is quite brief, but shows a number of possible configurations. I’d say that in most cases, what you want is simply the one shown in the ModSecurity examples. Please note that they made a mistake there, it’s not RequestReadyTimeout but RequestReadTimeout.
Additionally, when using ModSecurity you can stop the attack on its track after a few requests timed out, by blacklisting the IP and dropping its connections, allowing slots to be freed for other requests to arrive; this can be easily configured through this snipped, taken directly from the above-linked post:
RequestReadTimeout body=30
SecRule RESPONSE_STATUS "@streq 408" "phase:5,t:none,nolog,pass, setvar:ip.slow_dos_counter=+1,expirevar:ip.slow_dos_counter=60"
SecRule IP:SLOW_DOS_COUNTER "@gt 5" "phase:1,t:none,log,drop, msg:'Client Connection Dropped due to high # of slow DoS alerts'"
This should let you cover yourself up quite nicely, at least if you’re using hardened, with grsecurity enforcing per-user limits. But if you’re using hosting where you don’t have decision over the kernel – as I do – there is one further problem: the init script for apache does not respect the system limits at all — see bug #347301 .
The problem here is that when Apache is started during the standard system init, there are no limits set for the session is running from, and since it doesn’t use start-stop-daemon to launch the apache process itself, no limits are applied at all. This results in a quite easy DoS over the whole host as it will easily exhaust the system’s memory.
As I posted on the bug, there is a quick and dirty way to fix the situation by editing the init script itself, and change the way Apache is started up:
# Replace the following:
${APACHE2} ${APACHE2_OPTS} -k start
# With this
start-stop-daemon --start --pidfile "${PIDFILE}" ${APACHE2} -- ${APACHE2_OPTS} -k start
This way at least the system generic limits are applied properly. Though, please note that start-stop-daemon limitations will not allow you to set per-user limits this way.
On a different note, I’d like to spend a few words on telling why this particular vulnerability is interesting to me: this attack relies on long-winded POST requests that might have a very low bandwidth, because just a few bytes are sent before the timeout is hit… it is not unlike the RTSP-in-HTTP tunnelling that I have designed and documented in feng during the past years.
This also means that application-level firewalls will start sooner or later filtering these long-winded requests, and that will likely put the final nail on the coffin of the RTSP-in-HTTP tunnelling. I guess it’s definitely time for feng to move on and implement real HTTP-based pseudo-streaming instead.